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Process Safety Management (PSM), as a loss prevention management system, has been 
used for many years to limit and control risks in the Chemical Process Industries (CPI). Losses at 
chemical and petrochemical facilities are characterized by high energy fire and explosions which 
in many cases have received large press coverage.  Most CPI fires and explosions happened in 
organic hydrocarbon processes originating from mechanical integrity failures.  Mineral, 
metallurgical refining and pulp and paper processes, on the other hand, feature seemingly benign 
and often non combustible chemicals. Corrosion in acid plants, physical explosions of digesters, 
autoclaves, and black liquor recovery boilers have been more common than fires or combustion 
explosions. 
 
This paper presents case studies of incidents in several non-chemical occupancies and 
efforts made by some companies in Eastern Canada to incorporate elements of PSM as a tool for 




The chemical, pulp and paper, and mineral processing industries are capital intensive, 
labor intensive and are a heavy user of natural resources. There are many methods to manage 
risk in these industries. Risk can be transferred through insurance, it can be eliminated by 
abandoning a high risk process, or it can be managed and minimized by a more thoughtful, 
systematic approach.                                     
 
According to Moore1, losses in the chemical processing and metallurgical refining are 
often characterized by failures of mechanical systems that release high energy flammable, toxic 
or corrosive materials. In conventional industrial plants, hazards usually can be observed visually 
and evaluated according to established, prescriptive exposure-identification procedures and 





paper occupancies, most potential loss exposures or event scenarios are not discovered readily 
through the usual field methods and intuitive techniques. This can only be done by a systematic 
approach using Process Safety Management (PSM). 
 
Process Safety Management (PSM) 
 
Process Safety Management is a U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) regulation that is intended to prevent an incident like the 1984 toxic gas release in 
Bhopal, India2. The process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemical standard, 29 
CFR 1910.19, is intended to prevent or minimize the consequences of a catastrophic release of 
toxic, reactive, flammable or explosive hazardous chemical from a process. PSM has been 
developed over many years to guide the chemical process industry toward safer facilities before 
being adopted by various regulatory agencies. It is considered the foundation of all loss 
prevention activities3. 
 
Earliest PSM efforts started in Europe in the 1960s. It got larger application following 
significant incidents and passage of the European Economic Council’s (EEC) Directive 
82/501/EEC (also known as the “Seveso Directive”), with revisions in 1997 known as “Seveso 
II”. Application of PSM in the United States was limited to a few progressive chemical 
companies until the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rule “Process 
Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals” (29 CFR Part 1910) was promulgated in 
1992.  This law was passed following publicity from a series of severe fire and explosion 
incidents.  
 
Canada has no formal or mandatory PSM regulations and instead, relies on high-hazard 
industries to voluntarily regulate themselves through chemical trade organizations and programs, 
such as Responsible Care.  These voluntary programs have key elements inherent in a PSM 
program. Until 1999, the Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada (MIACC) brought 
together representatives from the Canadian industrial sectors for the purpose of reducing the 
frequency and severity of major industrial accidents4. MIACC has initiated programs, such as 
Partnerships toward Safer Communities, Process Safety Management, and the Ideal Emergency 
Response System (ER2000)5. Presently, the Process Safety Management Division, part of the 
Canadian Society for Chemical Engineering (CSChE) is a continuation of work started in 1990 
under MIACC. More information can be obtained in the division website: 
http://www.cheminst.ca/divisons/psm 
 
PSM is a guide to applying chemical engineering discipline and methodology to 
increasing the performance efficiency of a process operation, in all its aspects. 
 
Traditional workplace health and Safety: 
1. Focuses on individual actions while considering interaction with equipment 
2. Occupational health exposures 
3. Significant legal and regulatory mandate 






Process safety management: 
1. Focuses on process: materials, equipment and systems 
2. Individuals and procedures are considered part of the system 
The objective is to eliminate process-related incidents. 
 
An effective Process Safety Management program will include6:  
1. Accountability  
2. Process Safety Knowledge 
3. Process Hazard Reviews 
4. Process Risk Management 
5. Mechanical Integrity 
6. Management of Change 
7. Incident Investigation 
8. Training of Personnel 
9. Contractor Oversight 
10. Emergency Response Planning 
11. Audits and Documentation 
12. Standards, Codes, and Laws 
 
Incidents in mineral, chemical, and pulp and paper industries are presented in this paper. The 
objective is to show that contributing factors are due to a lack of or a breakdown of Process 
Safety Management, regardless of the industry type.  
 
Incident Case Studies 
 
Case Study No 1: 
 
Summary of the incident 
 
On 5 July 1999, an explosion occurred at the Gramercy Works Plant operated by Kaiser 
Aluminium and Chemical Corporation in Gramercy, Louisiana, injuring 29 persons, as reported 
by US MSHA (1999). The plant processed bauxite ore into alumina using the ‘Bayer Process’, 
which involves the caustic leaching of bauxite at elevated temperature and pressure. The plant 
processed about 9000 tons of bauxite ore each day, producing 3200 tons of alumina. 
 
An unplanned electrical power failure occurred approximately 34 minutes before the 
explosion. This caused all electrically powered processes to stop, including slurry pumps. Gas-
fired boilers continued to deliver high-pressure steam to pressure vessels in the digestion area. 
Many relief valves failed to function because they were shut off and some relief piping was 
clogged with scale. An explosion occurred in several vessels. There were no combustible liquids 
and no fires resulted. The pressure wave from the exploding pressure vessels destroyed the plant. 







Photo of damage to bauxite plant following pressure vessel failure (courtesy MSHA). 
 
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) Investigators determined that the 
explosion occurred as a result of a build-up of excessive pressure within vessels in the digestion 
area and the subsequent rupture of the vessels. Rupture of the vessels exposed the superheated 
liquid contents to atmospheric pressure resulting in a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion 
(BLEVE).  
 
During the MSHA investigation, it was determined that:  
 
- The pressure relief safety system installed to relieve excessive pressure in several 
flash tanks was inoperative; 
- Sections of the pressure relief piping designed to vent excessive pressures for the 
digestion flash tanks were partially blocked, and, in at least one case, was totally 
blocked with scale; 
- The mine operator routinely allowed the digestion process to be operated while 
pressure in one or more pressure vessels exceeded the design capacity intended by 
the manufacturer; and 
- Digestion operators had not been adequately trained in the safety and health 
aspects and safe operating procedures. 
 
There are many representative PSM failures associated with this incident including: 
 
o No formal oversight PSM program in place; 
o Process hazard analyses not conducted; 
o Poor mechanical integrity of pressure relief valves and piping systems; 
o No management of change; 






Case Study No 2: 
 
Summary of the incident 
 
On July 17, 2001, an explosion involving sulfuric acid occurred in Delaware City, 
Delaware. A work crew had been repairing a catwalk above a sulfuric acid storage tank farm 
when a spark from their hot work ignited flammable vapors in one of the tanks. This tank had 
holes in its roof and shell due to corrosion. The tank collapsed, and one the contract workers was 








The root causes were determined to be: 
 
o The company did not have an adequate mechanical integrity management 
system to prevent and address safety and environmental hazards from the deterioration of 
H2SO4 storage tanks. 
 
o Repeated recommendations for an internal inspection were not taken in consideration. 
 
o A leak in the shell of tank, observed in May 2001, was not repaired. Instead, the tank 
remained in service. 
 
o MOC systems inadequately addressed conversion of the tanks from fresh to spent acid 
service. 
 
- No engineering calculations were made to determine proper sizing for the inerting 
system. 
- The tank conversion was completed without review of changes by technical experts, 
process hazard analyses, or prestartup safety reviews–all elements of a proper MOC 
program. 
 








Case Study No 3: 
 
Summary of the incident 
 
On January 16, 2002, highly toxic hydrogen sulfide gas leaked from a sewer manway at 
pulp and paper mill in Pennington, Alabama8. Several people working near the manway were 
exposed to the gas. Two contractors were killed. Eight people were injured. The County 
paramedics who transported the victims to hospitals reported symptoms of hydrogen sulfide 
exposure. 
 
Sodium hydrosulfide (NaSH) was being unloaded on January 15–16. The unloading 
station consists of a large concrete pad sloped to a collection drain. The pit–commonly referred 
to as the oil pit–collects rainwater, condensate, and occasionally spilled chemicals from the 
unloading station. The job required contractor employees to work in or near the oil pit, which–at 
the time of the incident on January 16–contained liquid. It estimated that it was typical for 
approximately 5 gallons of NaSH to collect in the oil pit from various sources (pump leaking, 
flushing unloading lines, etc.) during each offloading of a tank truck. Fifteen tank trucks of 
NaSH had unloaded in the 24 hours prior to the incident. To avoid having the construction crew 
stand in the fluid-filled pit, an operator opened a valve to drain the oil pit. The valve was then 
closed and relocked. In the same area, three Transport tank trucks carrying NaSH. With the 
assistance of plant operators, one of the truck drivers connected his vehicle to the unloading 
hose. Witnesses estimated that when the connection was made, up to 5 gallons of NaSH spilled 
to the collection drain. On the day of the incident, sulfuric acid was being added to the acid 
sewer to control pH downstream in the effluent area. NaSH from the oil pit and the collection 
drain drained to the sewer and reacted with the sulfuric acid to form H2S. Within 5 minutes, an 
invisible cloud of H2S gas leaked through a gap in the seal of a manway.  This incident is a 
reactive chemical incident as defined in the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board (CSB) reactive chemical hazard investigation.  
 
 








The paper mill uses the Kraft process to produce pulp. Pulp is a material derived from 
wood chips. It is the main raw material in making paper. In this process, a mixture of chemicals 
called the pulping liquor is used to treat wood chips that will be processed into pulp. The pulping 
liquor is made of sodium hydroxide and sodium sulfide. This pulping liquor is recycled through 
the process and occasionally fresh chemicals are added to the liquor in order to maintain proper 
liquor chemistry. Sodium hydrosulfide, or NaSH, which was involved in this incident, was one 
of these make-up chemicals. 
 




Recommendations include the following: 
 
- Apply good engineering and process safety principles to process sewer systems; 
- Evaluate process sewers where chemicals may collect and interact, and identify 
potential hazardous reaction scenarios; 
- Identify areas where hydrogen sulfide could be present, institute safeguards to 
limit exposure and require appropriate training (process safety knowledge and 
training of personnel); and 




These incidents at widely differing industrial plants emphasize how important it is to 
properly implement and adhere to PSM. The cost of not implementing effective incident 
prevention can be very high. These incidents caused loss of life, impact to the environment, 
property damage and business interruption.  All could have been avoided if management systems 
such as PSM had been in place or more effective. 
 
According to Kelly H. Ferguson9, a study by FM Global shows that a breakdown in PSM 
is the root cause of nearly all losses in the CPI and other industries with chemical processes.  The 
study concludes that facilities with culturally embedded and effectively implemented PSM 
programs are significantly less likely to suffer a high-impact loss.  
 
Hopefully the case studies presented in this paper will help promote awareness, 
understanding, and use of Process Safety Management tools, and techniques within non-





and pulp and paper industries to eliminate or mitigate process related incidents. Further 
development of PSM ideas for implementation and best practices in occupancies other than 
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